The Distorted Reality of Civil Recourse Theory by Calnan, Alan
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2012
The Distorted Reality of Civil Recourse Theory
Alan Calnan
Southwestern Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan Calnan, The Distorted Reality of Civil Recourse Theory , 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 159 (2012)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss1/6
  
 
159 
THE DISTORTED REALITY OF CIVIL RECOURSE 
THEORY  
ALAN CALNAN* 
 
ABSTRACT 
In their recent article Torts as Wrongs, Professors John C.P. Goldberg and 
Benjamin C. Zipursky offer their most complete and accessible explanation of the 
civil recourse theory (CRT) of tort law.  A purely descriptive account, CRT holds 
that tort law is exclusively a scheme of private rights for the redress of legal wrongs 
and is not a pragmatic mechanism for imposing strict liability or implementing 
public policy.  The present paper challenges this view by revealing critical errors in 
its perspective, methodology, and analysis.  It shows that Goldberg and Zipursky do 
not objectively observe tort law and uncritically report what they see; instead, they 
employ a partial perspective to interpret the facts and rely on their own 
predilections to support their subjective conclusions.  Constrained by this biased 
outlook, Goldberg and Zipursky misinterpret the concept of strict liability, grossly 
underestimating its pervasiveness, embeddedness, and practical and structural 
significance.  For similar reasons, the authors simply ignore the prodigious 
presence of instrumental considerations in the core wrongs-based action of 
negligence, viewing them as marked departures from tort law rather than accretive 
adaptations to its evolving content.  Having exposed the distorted reality of CRT, the 
paper encourages the authors to recast that theory as a normative enterprise—one 
which prescribes a treatment for unprincipled instrumentalism and a plan for 
restoring rights and wrongs to tort law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade or so, Professors John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. 
Zipursky have incrementally developed a descriptive theory of tort law called civil 
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recourse theory.1  In their recent article Torts as Wrongs,2 they present their most 
complete and accessible account of that theory.  In short, civil recourse theory holds 
that “[t]orts are legal wrongs for which courts provide victims a right of civil 
recourse—a right to sue for a remedy.”3 
Embedded within this ostensibly simple account are a number of complex 
challenges to Torts’ reigning theoretical orthodoxies.  The claim that torts are 
wrongs is actually a direct attack upon the commonly held pragmatic conception of 
Torts as accidentally caused losses that the law seeks to prevent, administer, and 
allocate to promote social welfare.4  Conversely, the contention that torts are legal 
wrongs is a pointed rebuke of the corrective justice view of Torts as moral 
transgressions that the law punishes or annuls in accordance with deeply ingrained 
ethical principles.5  Finally, the assertion that torts are private rights of recourse 
counters both the pragmatists’ image of Torts as public behavioral directives or 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.  I would like to thank Christopher Miller, 
Adam Houtz, and Jahmy Graham for providing helpful research and technical assistance on 
this article. 
 
1
 Professor Zipursky first introduced civil recourse theory in his 1998 article Rights, 
Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts.  Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and 
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (hereinafter Zipursky, Rights, 
Wrongs, and Recourse).  Since that time the authors, both individually and together, have 
described and applied this theory in numerous pieces.  See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364 (2005); John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law From the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on 
Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563 (2006) (hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Internal 
Point of View); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending 
to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve 
Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (2006); John C.P. Goldberg, 
The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of 
Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (hereinafter Goldberg, Constitutional Status); John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 
(1998) (hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, MacPherson); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 657 (2001); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized 
Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625 (2002) (hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Unrealized); John C.P. 
Goldberg, Wrongs Without Recourse: A Comment on Jason Solomon’s Judging Plaintiffs, 61 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 9 (2008) (hereinafter Goldberg, Wrongs Without Recourse); 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) 
(hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse). 
 
2
 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 
(2010) (hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs). 
 
3
 Id. at 985. 
 
4
  Id. at 920-25, 926-28, 954-57. 
 
5
  See id. at 932; see also Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 726-27. 
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liability rules6 and the opposed moralist vision of Torts as specific private duties to 
repair personal injuries.7 
Though controversial,8 civil recourse theory is factually accurate in many 
respects.  Tort law is concerned about wrongs like negligence and intentional torts.9  
The wrongs of Torts—which generally exclude even the worst forms of 
nonfeasance10—are legal and not necessarily moral.11  And wrongs do afford private 
                                                          
 
6
  See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 1, at 44, 55-60. 
 
7
  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 718-26. 
 
8
 Goldberg and Zipursky’s civil recourse theory has been the subject of numerous 
critiques.  See, e.g., Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts: A Reply to 
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1023 (2005) (hereinafter Calnan, 
In Defense); W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671 
(2008); Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Putting “Duty” in Its Place: A Reply to 
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1225 (2008); Jason M. Solomon, 
Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765 (2009); Jane 
Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1529 (2006). 
 
9
 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (2000) (noting that “[i]n the great majority of 
cases today, tort liability is grounded in the conclusion that the wrongdoer was at fault in a 
legally recognizable way” and that legal fault in Torts usually consists of intentional or 
negligent wrongs).  Even Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge that “[t]here is nothing new or 
even surprising about these statements; hornbook authors have said it all along.” Goldberg & 
Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 985. 
 
10
 Nonfeasance is the failure to act on behalf of another.  In Torts, a person generally has 
no duty to aid another, even if she could provide that aid with very little risk or burden to 
herself, unless she creates the risk endangering the other party, undertakes to provide 
assistance and thereby increases an existing risk, or enters into a special relationship with the 
endangered party or someone who poses a foreseeable risk to that party.  See DOBBS, supra 
note 9, at 854-55. 
 
11
 I argued this point in my 1997 book Justice and Tort Law.  ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND 
TORT LAW (1997) (hereinafter CALNAN, JUSTICE).  After recounting Tort’s movement from 
trespass to negligence to strict liability, I explained their common normative basis: 
How can these very different types of conduct all be considered wrongful?  Certainly, 
moral fault is not the key, since past and present versions of tort law have imposed 
liability without it.  Likewise, if the outcome-responsibility of causation were alone 
sufficient, the requirement of fault or ultrahazardousness would be superfluous.  The 
answer to this enigma is that these activities are all wrongful in the political sense of 
being irresponsible. 
 
  To be irresponsible in the manner I propose, three conditions must be met.  First, 
there must be a duty or responsibility to perform or refrain from performing a 
particular activity.  Second, the responsibility must be just—that is, it must not be 
unduly restrictive of freedom.  Finally, the responsibility must be breached by the act 
or omission of the party subject to it.  If these conditions are met, the offending 
conduct is wrongful, even if it did not proceed from an evil motive or wanton 
demeanor. 
Id. at 123 (footnote omitted). 
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rights to sue and not simply grounds for public sanctions.12  There is only one 
problem.  Taken as a whole, civil recourse theory is fundamentally wrong because it 
distorts rather than describes Torts’ essential truth. 
It pains me to say this.  Like Goldberg and Zipursky, I am a Torts 
foundationalist.13  In prior works, I have argued that early tort law (or, more 
precisely, the law that preceded modern tort law) was essentially a law of wrongs,14 
and have offered my own normative theory, called liberal-justice theory, suggesting 
how it should be reconstituted.15  So I am naturally sympathetic to any work that 
                                                          
 
12
 This right, too, was discussed in-depth in JUSTICE IN TORT LAW.  See id. at 23-30, 38-53, 
62-71, 124-29.  In the following passage, I describe the unique, relational nature of that right: 
To establish a right, it is not enough that the aggrieved party sustain harm from an 
action which violates a general or special duty.  It also must be shown that she was an 
intended beneficiary of the applicable duty.  The beneficiary status of the claimant 
establishes her unique entitlement to affect the actions of the duty-holder, and thus 
links the parties in a special relationship. 
 
  Tort law contains a similar requirement.  One seeking redress for the harmful effects 
of a transaction may not prevail simply by showing that the alleged perpetrator acted 
wrongfully.  She must also show that the action was wrongful as to her.  To meet this 
burden, it must appear that she was owed a duty not to be subjected to the injury-
producing conduct.  In essence, the claimant must be one of a class of individuals who 
were to enjoy the benefits of the duty’s protection.  Where this connection is 
established, the claimant possesses a distinctive power to sanction the perpetrator’s 
exercise of autonomy by forcing her to pay compensation for the harm it has caused. 
Id. at 129.  
More recently, I have elaborated on the right to recourse in Torts, arguing that it actually 
includes three subsidiary rights: the right of unilateral personal response, which permits 
endangered parties to take immediate preemptive action to stop the threats against them; the 
right of state-assisted response, which bestows upon aggrieved parties the power to institute 
litigation against their suspected offenders if they can show probable cause for their actions; 
and a right of state-assisted redress, which arises when the plaintiff establishes the required 
elements of proof for a recognized tort.  See Alan Calnan, The Instrumental Justice of Private 
Law, 78 UMKC L. REV. 559, 585-89 (2010).  While Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory of civil 
recourse addresses the right of state-assisted redress, it mostly ignores the right of unilateral 
personal response, and it completely fails to account for the right of state-assisted response.  
See id. at 588 n.130.  
 
13
 Generally speaking, foundationalists are interested in the law’s structures, practices, 
principles, concepts, and values.  By contrast, functionalists are concerned with the law’s 
goals and usages. 
 
14
 See ALAN CALNAN, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW (2005) (hereinafter CALNAN, 
REVISIONIST) (refuting the Holmesian view that tort law radically transformed from a 
primitive, retributive system into a sophisticated engine of public policy, and defending the 
revisionist thesis that the law gradually evolved with great continuity and consistency from 
Greco-Roman concepts of justice, first taking root during the Twelfth-Century Renaissance as 
a form of morally strict law and equity, then developing rigorous rules of social responsibility, 
and finally, adding a general standard of reasonable care). 
 
15
 See ALAN CALNAN, DUTY AND INTEGRITY IN TORT LAW (2009) (hereinafter CALNAN, 
DUTY AND INTEGRITY) (critiquing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS’ pragmatic conception 
of duty and proposing an alternative, liberal-justice approach called “duty as integrity,” which 
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highlights Torts’ conceptual coherence.  But today’s tort law is not the relatively 
simple collection of trespasses (originally meaning “wrongs”) we inherited from our 
English forbears.16  It is something far more complex, political, and pluralistic. 
Indeed, the muddled state of modern tort law should not be surprising to any tort 
scholar, least of all Goldberg and Zipursky, who query “[h]ow is it that academics 
have lost their feel for this basic legal category?”17  As Goldberg and Zipursky 
themselves acknowledge, the Blackstonian scheme of rights, wrongs, and remedies 
that allegedly grounds civil recourse theory18 was repudiated by instrumental 
theorists in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries.19  Led by an influential 
group of scholars, these instrumentalists sought not just to promote a public agenda, 
but also to remove any obstacles that stood in their way.20  Their charge was quickly 
embraced by a growing group of eager judges, who battled a rising tide of tort cases 
in the wake of the industrial revolution.  Staunchly antiformal, these judges sought to 
break free of the law’s wrongs-based limits to fix the social problems presented or 
reflected by such litigation.  Gradually, they began to do just that, reinterpreting, 
modifying, abolishing, or supplementing many of Torts’ traditional concepts and 
doctrines.21  After a century of sculpting, it would not be shocking to find the 
                                                          
builds upon the work of Ronald Dworkin to provide a fully integrated and comprehensive 
methodology for analyzing tort duty questions); CALNAN, JUSTICE supra note 11 
(demonstrating how Aristotelian justice concepts and liberal political and moral principles 
shape the structure and content of modern American tort law); Alan Calnan, Anomalies in 
Intentional Tort Law, 1 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 187 (2005) (hereinafter Calnan, Anomalies) 
(demonstrating the common, liberal-justice characteristics of intentional tort, strict liability, 
and negligence, and suggesting a new liberal-justice framework to help explain, justify, and 
differentiate these theories); Calnan, In Defense, supra note 8 (rehabilitating the concept of 
corrective justice, and showing how that concept completes a broader liberal-justice theory of 
Torts that explains and justifies many of the law’s key features); Alan Calnan, Distributive 
and Corrective Justice Issues in Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 577 
(1998) (arguing that liberal-justice concepts, which are often missing from the dialogue about 
tobacco litigation, discourage the use of such litigation as a means of regulating the tobacco 
industry and compensating potentially undeserving claimants); Alan Calnan, The Fault(s) in 
Negligence Law, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 695 (2007) (hereinafter Calnan, Fault(s)) (arguing 
that tortious fault is not a strong moral concept, but is a soft liberal idea epitomized by the 
notion of unreasonableness, and demonstrating how negligence law distorts this notion, both 
by including within its ambit strict liability doctrines it should exclude and by excluding some 
intentional tort and strict liability doctrines it should include); Alan Calnan, Strict Liability 
and the Liberal-Justice Theory of Torts, 38 N.M. L. REV. 95 (2008) (hereinafter, Calnan, Strict 
Liability) (revealing the historical and classical origins of strict liability, explaining its 
inherent morality, and proposing a new, liberal-justice paradigm of tort law). 
 
16
 See CALNAN, JUSTICE supra note 11, at 104-05 (trespass meant wrong); ROBERT C. 
PALMER, ENGLISH LAW IN THE AGE OF THE BLACK DEATH: 1348-1381 152 (1998) (same). 
 
17
 See Goldberg & Zipurksy, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 919. 
 
18
 See id. at 928; see also Goldberg, Constitutional Status, supra note 1, at 549-59. 
 
19
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, MacPherson, supra note 1, at 1753-66 (discussing the 
development of this view and its influence on modern American Tort theory). 
 
20
 See id. at 1762-64 (discussing the infusion of public policy considerations into 
negligence’s duty concept). 
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instrumentalists’ handiwork indelibly etched into Torts’ still malleable form.22  In 
fact, it would be shocking if the law remained intact. 
Despite their incredulity, Goldberg and Zipursky do acknowledge one of 
instrumentalism’s key Torts legacies: the theory of strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities.  Noting that strict liability explicitly disavows “having anything 
to do with wrongs,” Goldberg and Zipursky concede that this theory may represent a 
“true exception[] to the otherwise wrongs-based nature of tort law” and poses “the 
sharpest challenge”  to their wrong-centric theory of civil recourse.23  However, they 
quickly minimize the importance of this “sui generis” exception, arguing that it “sits 
at the margin of tort law” and thus is “hardly substantial.”24  Because strict liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities is not “emblematic of a broad area of tort law,”25 
they conclude, “its existence does not count as evidence against [their] general 
interpretive account.”26 
But this is precisely what is wrong with civil recourse theory.  Goldberg and 
Zipursky not only ignore most of the evidence that does count against them, they 
drastically misjudge its significance.  In the remainder of this essay, I shall marshal 
the proof debunking their theory, first identifying their perspectival errors in Part II, 
and then showing how these errors taint their analysis.  Thus, Part III argues that the 
authors undervalue strict liability’s theoretical status; Part IV contends that they 
misconstrue strict liability’s relationship to wrongs-based theories and concepts; and 
Part V asserts that they disregard instrumentalism’s prevalence in the wrongs-based 
action of negligence.  When these errors are corrected and all the facts are revealed 
and examined, a far different picture of tort law emerges.  Torts is not, as Goldberg 
and Zipursky allege, a cohesive, unitary system of civil wrongs and private justice,27 
but is more of a disjointed patchwork of moral and instrumental canons haphazardly 
interwoven into a decidedly diverse institution serving both public and private 
objectives.28 
                                                          
 
21
 I discuss these changes in Part V of this article.  See infra text accompanying notes 147-
202. 
 
22
 Surprisingly, Goldberg himself appears not to be surprised by this development.  In 
describing the emergence of instrumentalism in Torts, Goldberg acknowledges that it is “no 
surprise to find that judges filled [the law’s concepts] with their own beliefs as to sound 
policy.” See John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 520-21 
(2003) (hereinafter Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort). 
 
23
 Goldberg & Zipurksy, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 951. 
 
24
 Id. at 951-52. 
 
25
 Id. at 952. 
 
26
 Id. 
 
27
 Id. at 978 (“We have offered the idea of civil recourse and the ideas of relational, legal, 
injury-inclusive wrongs as unifying features of tort law and tort theory . . . .”). 
 
28
 In rejecting Goldberg and Zipursky’s unitary theory, noted pragmatist and current Co-
Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, Professor Michael Green, cogently 
summarized this pluralistic view: 
[T]ort law is better explained by recognizing that it contains strands of both corrective 
justice and deterrence.  Indeed, . . . [t]ort law is too multi-variegated, too influenced 
by the fortuity of the development of a “paradigm” (to borrow from Thomas Kuhn) 
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In reaching this conclusion, I am not suggesting that civil recourse theory has no 
value.  Only a valuable theory deserves this sort of scrutiny and criticism.  What I 
am saying, however, is that civil recourse’s value remains unrealized because its 
mission is misconceived.  While civil recourse is not an accurate snapshot of Torts’ 
present condition, it may offer a blueprint for a new (or renewed) edition.  Once 
Goldberg and Zipursky recognize this fact, they no longer will have to struggle to 
explain the chaos that tort law has become, but can finally join the fight to fix it.29 
II.  A DISTORTED PERSPECTIVE 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s problems begin with their perspective.  They hold 
themselves out as legal scientists who impartially observe tort law and objectively 
report and interpret the facts to ascertain the truth.  The reality, however, is quite 
different. In presenting civil recourse theory, Goldberg and Zipursky seem to collect 
and judge the facts, validating those that support their viewpoint and explaining 
away those that do not.  These are the tactics of the polemicist, not the measured 
methodology of the scientist.  
Consider Goldberg and Zipursky’s treatment of strict liability.  As noted above, 
Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge the fact of strict liability, but they summarily 
dismiss it as an insubstantial aberration to the theory of Torts as Wrongs.30  Even if 
one accepts the accuracy of their characterization of strict liability, a point I will 
refute below, their refusal to address this anomaly is itself scientifically suspect.31  
Unlike the fields of astrophysics or quantum mechanics, where flawed speculative 
theorizing is necessitated by limitations on direct observation,32 Torts is easily 
                                                          
established by an academic and judicial movement, such as led to the adoption of 
strict products liability; by something as serendipitous as an influential judge coining a 
memorable phrase, as Cardozo did with “danger invites rescue”; by changes 
in culture, political winds, or media coverage, as has been prevalent during the 
decades of tort reform; by popular dissatisfaction with the operation of the tort system, 
which produced workers’ compensation and thereby withdrew a substantial swath of 
the accidental-injury universe from the tort domain; by a scholarly article; or by 
numerous other contingencies or fortuities that affect the course that the tort river 
follows. 
Michael D. Green, Apportionment, Victim Reliance, and Fraud: A Comment, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1027, 1042-43 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
 
29
 As Goldberg and Zipursky freely admit, “[o]ur point in [Torts as Wrongs] is not to set 
forth a normative theory of adjudication in the common law or to defend a jurisprudential 
view about how much is already ‘in’ the common law.”  See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as 
Wrongs, supra note 2, at 976.  Instead, their objective, as Goldberg has defined it elsewhere, is 
simply to explain “what is tort and what does it do.”  See Goldberg, Wrongs Without 
Recourse, supra note 1, at 13. 
 
30
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 951 (admitting that certain 
strict liability theories may create “true exceptions to the otherwise wrongs-based nature of 
tort law,” but countering that “[t]o allow as such is hardly to make a substantial concession”). 
 
31
 See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 70-72 (2d ed. 
1970) (arguing that anomalies in scientific theories compel scientists to alter the way they 
explain or classify natural phenomena). 
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studied and readily tested.  A tort either requires a wrong or it does not.  If it does 
not, the existence of the wrong-free tort still must be explained.  One cannot simply 
disregard the wrong-free anomaly until a better theory comes along, much in the way 
phlogiston theorists ignored evidence that burned substances often gain weight.33  
Instead, the Torts scientist must amend her description to account for the misfit facts, 
or propose a new, comprehensive theory to take its place. 
To put the point in practical terms, suppose a scientist is handed a liquid-filled 
test tube and asked to report its contents.  After subjecting the liquid to chemical 
testing, she discovers a large amount of Substance A and a small amount of 
Substance B. Each substance possesses its own independent properties, which 
remain intact when the two are mixed together.  To accurately describe the mixture, 
the scientist, as observer and truth-seeker, must account for the presence of both 
substances.  She cannot describe the solution as Substance A, and offer a 
justification for excluding Substance B from her report. 
Yet this is exactly what Goldberg and Zipursky have done in their descriptive 
theory of tort law.  After examining the murky mixture of Torts, they discovered a 
great deal of wrongs and a little bit of strict liability.  Rather than describing the 
concoction in a way that accounts for both ingredients, they simply dismissed the 
strict liability component on the ground that it is less deserving of recognition.  Their 
resulting conclusion—that Torts is essentially a law of Wrongs—is thus more 
editorial opinion than factual finding.  Calling that conclusion “interpretive” may 
make it appear less susceptible to refutation, but it still lacks the hallmarks of good 
science—natural, legal, or otherwise. 
Even as a strictly interpretive endeavor, civil recourse theory is decidedly near-
sighted.  Goldberg and Zipursky oversimplify their description of tort law because 
they mistake interpretive theorizing for basic taxonomy.  For years, these scholars 
have battled a group of instrumental thinkers for “descriptive superiority” in tort 
theory.34  As noted earlier, Goldberg and Zipursky argue that the tort system is a 
                                                          
 
32
 See Quantum Gravity, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Dec. 26, 2005, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-gravity/ (noting the difficulties of conducting 
experiments to test theories of quantum gravity which seek to eliminate the conflict between 
these fundamental fields of science).  
 
33
 See, e.g., STEPHEN F. MASON, A HISTORY OF THE SCIENCES 302-13 (1962) (describing 
the now-antiquated theory that fire resulted from burning a natural, physical element called 
phlogiston). Ironically, Goldberg and Zipursky subscribe to the same principle using virtually 
the same analogy, noting that “[t]he fading of an idea is sometimes warranted: it is good that 
scientists no longer talk of phlogiston.”  See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra 
note 2, at 929. 
 
34
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 920.  In a separate article, 
Goldberg catalogues various theories of tort law, including Compensation-Deterrence, 
Enterprise Liability, Economic Deterrence, Corrective Justice, and Social Justice.  See 
Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort, supra note 22.  At the end of that piece, he urges his 
readers to “[r]ecognize that the domain of tort theory is not exhausted by a two-sided fight 
between economic theories and justice-based theories,” but consists of a “five-way” battle for 
supremacy.  Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort, supra note 22, at 582.  However, in the 
current piece, Goldberg and Zipursky find the battle lines more narrowly drawn, noting that 
“scholars have convinced themselves that the subject of Torts is really about accidentally 
caused losses, not wrongs, and that the central task of tort law is to reallocate such losses in 
the most justifiable manner,” and adding that “a civil-recourse theory that predicates rights of 
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private process for redressing personal wrongs,35 while their adversaries contend that 
it is a public mechanism for allocating social losses.36  Given this conflict, Goldberg 
and Zipursky are not solely or even primarily interested in describing what they see, 
but, like natural scientists who have gathered all the facts, are more concerned about 
controlling its classification. 
Tort litigation, they have found, contains a number of distinctive characteristics, 
including its private instigation, bipolar structure, proof of agency or causation, 
existence of personal injury, range of remedies, requirement of wrongdoing, and 
sometimes, liability without fault.37  While some of these features—like the 
wrongdoing requirement—may appear more suitable to a system that redresses 
wrongs, other characteristics—including the strict liability standard—may be shared 
by loss spreading systems like worker’s compensation.38  The question for Goldberg 
and Zipursky is whether tort law’s characteristics overall place it more clearly in one 
category than the other.  If Torts is either a law of Wrongs or a law of Losses, then 
they need not account for all things Tort; they need only search for the closest fit, 
choosing the category which best describes the greatest number of Torts’ most 
important characteristics.39  In their view, Wrongs match better than Losses, so they 
can confidently classify Torts as Wrongs without explaining misfit, Loss-based 
doctrines like strict liability.  These anomalies, it seems, lack any significant 
taxonomic effect. 
What Goldberg and Zipursky overlook is that tort jurisprudence is not a natural 
science, and tort law is not susceptible to such scientific classification.  Natural 
science studies the physical world of nature.  Human science, by contrast, studies the 
world that human beings create for themselves.  Jurisprudence, in particular, is a 
human science that examines the rules that people use to regulate their behavior, 
                                                          
action on wrongs, not losses, comfortably shows how tort law hangs together.”  See Goldberg 
& Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 986. 
 
35
 Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 937-53. 
 
36
 See id. at 920-28.  
 
37
 See id. at 937-71 (discussing all features except bipolarity); see also Zipursky, Civil 
Recourse, supra note 1, at 699-709 (discussing bipolarity).  
 
38
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 1098 (noting that under most worker’s compensation 
statutes, “[t]he employer . . . is strictly liable for injury incurred in the course and scope of 
employment”). 
 
39
 The process here resembles that used by natural scientists to describe newly discovered 
species.  For example, the scientist who first encountered a school of dolphins would need to 
consult existing taxonomies of living creatures to determine their true nature.  On the surface, 
dolphins resemble fish because they possess sleek, smooth bodies, and use fins and flippers to 
swim in water for long periods of time.  See Dolphin, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 
2008), http://www. encyclopedia.com/topic/dolphin.aspx.  Yet these denizens of the deep also 
bear the characteristics of mammals in that they are warm blooded, have hair, breathe air, bear 
live offspring, and nurse their young with milk.  Dolphin Frequently Asked Questions, THE 
INSTITUTE FOR MARINE MAMMAL STUDIES, http://www.imms.org/dolphinfaq.php#q1.  After 
examining the class characteristics for fish and mammals, the scientist would need to see how 
many of the dolphin’s attributes are covered in each category, and how important these 
characteristics are in defining the creatures in that group.  Using this process, she would 
conclude, as scientists traditionally have, that dolphins are mammals because their mammalian 
traits predominate over their other, nonconforming characteristics.  Id. 
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with tort jurisprudence specifically governing behaviors that result in noncontractual, 
civil injuries. 
As philosopher Isaiah Berlin observed, the fundamentally different worlds of 
natural and human science require fundamentally different methods and standards of 
investigation.40  Unlike the natural scientist, who studies her subject from without, 
the human scientist looks at her subject from within.41  In this respect, the human 
scientist’s own values, customs, culture, beliefs, and experiences—including her 
biases and prejudices—become part of the object of study.42  Thus, her perspective 
frames her vision and inhibits her objectivity.  While this filtered lens bedevils all 
social scientists, it is particularly acute for legal jurisprudes, who typically belong to, 
and often attempt to influence, the very field of law they purport to describe. 
Given these perspectival limitations, Berlin argues that human scientists should 
not seek to emulate natural scientists, but should make three adjustments in their 
mode of inquiry.  First, they must change their point of view, abandoning their own 
preconceptions so far as possible, and imagining the thoughts and emotions of their 
subjects.43  Second, they must invoke their common sense to guide these reflections 
and to assemble them into plausible accounts of the institutions or events in 
question.44  Finally, because of the complexity of human motivation, human 
scientists should seek primarily to understand and explain each human practice as a 
unique and independent phenomenon and not “ignore or twist . . . particular events, 
persons, [or] predicaments, in the name of laws, theories, [or] principles derived 
from other fields[–]logical, ethical, metaphysical, [or] scientific[–]which the nature 
of the medium renders inapplicable[.]”45 
Civil recourse theory—presented as the new human science of Torts—abides 
none of these prescriptions, relying instead on the miscast methodologies of natural 
science.  Goldberg and Zipursky treat the paradigms of Wrongs and Losses as fully 
realized and mutually exclusive classifications—much in the way natural scientists 
distinguish animals from plants under the Linnaean taxonomic system.46  This 
treatment, however, is far from justified.  Prior to the nineteenth century, Torts was 
                                                          
 
40
 See Isaiah Berlin, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 26, 2004, 
revised May 25, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berlin/#4.1. 
 
41
 See id. 
 
42
 See id. 
 
43
 See id.  As Berlin noted, “[w]ithout a capacity for sympathy and imagination beyond 
any required by a physicist, there is no vision of either past or present, neither of others nor of 
ourselves.”  ISAIAH BERLIN, The Concept of Scientific History, in CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS OF ISAIAH BERLIN 103, 136 (Henry Hardy ed., 1978). 
 
44
 See Isaiah Berlin, supra note 40. 
 
45
 BERLIN, supra note 43, at 141-42. 
 
46
 The Linnaean classification system is the modern method of classifying living 
organisms.  See Taxonomy, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ topic/584695/taxonomy.  Developed by Swedish 
biologist Carolus Linnaeus in 1758, the Linnaean system divides all things into five separate 
kingdoms—animals, plants, bacteria, fungi, and protozoans—and classifies members of each 
kingdom according to six characteristics—phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species—
which range from the general to the specific.  Id.  
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not considered an independent field of law, let alone one worthy of classification.47  
Instead, it consisted of a loose assemblage of noncontract cases litigated under a 
diverse array of ancient forms of action.48  When Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. 
presented the first true theory of Torts in the late 1800s, he did not clearly delineate 
the law’s fundamental characteristics.  If anything, he made them more opaque. 
Holmes divided all torts into two distinct categories—fault and strict liability49—
but grounded both in the same objective community standard.50  This taxonomy 
reflected the dynamism, volatility, and uncertainty of the moment.  Although pre-
modern tort law had relied heavily on Aristotelian and Roman concepts of justice,51 
Holmes and a rising group of realist thinkers believed the law should be gradually 
stripped of its moral veneer and rededicated to serving the public welfare.52  
Nevertheless, Holmes still found a minor role for morality in this new legal regime, 
noting that “the law, if not a part of morality, is limited by it.”53  
So conceived, modern tort law did not begin exclusively as a law of Wrongs.  
Nor, for that matter, did it start as a law of Losses.  In fact, since its founding by 
Holmes, it has never known unity, harmony, or consistency of any sort.  Instead, it 
has always been something of an unlikely mélange.  The synthesis of classical 
philosophy and contemporary ideology, tort law emerged as a unique, inscrutable, 
and impetuous child with a complex and conflicted personality.  Golberg and 
Zipursky see in this progeny the traits of one parent alone and say that these 
attributes completely define who she is.  But, unlike in the natural sciences, where 
ancestral lineage strongly informs a subject’s classification,54  the human sciences 
lack such a definitive standard of evaluation.  To understand a human subject, one 
must look beyond her DNA. 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s myopic view is exacerbated by their first-person 
perspective.  When it comes to tort theory, these scientists are not neutral observers, 
but rather are active and interested participants.  They have demonstrated an affinity 
for corrective justice theory and have used many of its insights to construct their own 
wrongs-based theory of Torts.55  At the same time, they have strongly criticized 
                                                          
 
47
 See CALNAN, REVISIONIST, supra note 14, at 4-5. 
 
48
 See id. at 5. 
 
49
 See id. at 12-18. 
 
50
 See id. at 18. 
 
51
 See generally id. (tracing the development of these concepts in the early English 
common law of Torts). 
 
52
 See id. at 5 n. 11, 7 nn. 21-23, 8-9 nn. 28-33. 
 
53
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897). 
 
54
 See Taxonomy, supra note 46 (discussing the modern scientific classification system of 
cladistics, in which organisms are defined and grouped by the possession of one or more 
shared characteristics derived from a common ancestor and that were not present in any other 
ancestral group). 
 
55
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, MacPherson, supra note 1, at 1739, 1771 (crediting 
corrective justice theory with offering “powerful and insightful critiques” of instrumentalist 
theories and with making “important strides” toward the development of an alternative); John 
C. P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1515-
17 (2002) (registering broad sympathy with Professor Weinrib’s efforts to provide a theory 
 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
170 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:159 
 
instrumental theories of tort law and have repeatedly refuted their arguments.56  In 
fact, much of their current piece is devoted to that purpose.57  While their 
partisanship may reflect confidence in their descriptive account, it also may suggest 
an ulterior motive.  Elsewhere, Goldberg has argued that civil recourse is not just an 
explanation of the tort system: It is a constitutional requirement securing a structural 
right of due process.58  Thus, it is the type of concept that one might defend on 
principle as well as the facts. 
This does not mean that Goldberg and Zipursky have deliberately slanted the 
truth to suit their theory.  I certainly make no such claim.  But it does raise doubts 
about their objectivity and their capacity to recognize and reconstruct the subjective 
motivations of their subjects.  This concern stems from the authors’ interpretive 
choices.  Throughout their descriptive enterprise, Goldberg and Zipursky have made 
several hard decisions about how to gather and read their data—decisions that not 
only have directly and dramatically impacted their conclusions, but which 
consistently seem to favor a wrongs-based interpretation. 
Three of these choices are especially revealing.  After acknowledging the 
existence of both wrongs-based and strict liability theories of recovery, and noting 
the relative scarcity of strict liability actions, Goldberg and Zipursky determine that 
strict liability is merely a marginal and insignificant tort concept.59  Yet, as I shall 
discuss in the next part, they might have examined strict liability’s structural 
importance, long history, and extraordinary liberty-inhibiting potential, and reached 
exactly the opposite conclusion.60  Next, in support of their conclusion, Goldberg and 
Zipursky argue that many strict liability theories or doctrines actually may be 
explained as types of wrongs.61  However, as we shall see below, the authors do not 
                                                          
that treats tort law as a coherent practice that centrally concerns responding to wrongs); 
Goldberg & Zipursky, Unrealized, supra note 1, at 1647 n.56 (praising corrective justice 
theory for emphasizing the importance of “‘bipolarity’” to tort law (citing ERNEST J. WEINRIB, 
THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 134-36 (1995)). 
 
56
 See Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort, supra note 22, at 531-37, 540-44, 553-60 
(arguing that deterrence theories cannot explain the following Torts concepts: the private 
initiation of lawsuits, because no sanction is imposed if the victim chooses not to sue; the fault 
requirement, because it is too ambiguous to provide a certain deterrent threat; the causation 
requirement, because unduly risky conduct that requires deterrence may not result in harm; the 
availability of punitive and noneconomic damages, because they do not promote efficient 
deterrence; and the use of juries, because they lack the expertise necessary to make 
sophisticated judgments of efficient deterrence); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 
699-702 (arguing that economic theories cannot explain Tort’s structural bipolarity because no 
victim is needed to judge the inefficiency of the actor’s conduct, and no wrongdoer is needed 
to assess, extinguish, or spread the victim’s accident costs). 
 
57
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 953-71. 
 
58
 See Goldberg, Constitutional Status, supra note 1, at 594-95, 606-07, 625. 
 
59
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 951-52. 
 
60
 See infra text accompanying notes 68-83. 
 
61
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 951 & n.177 (contending 
that “[a] faultless trespass or a ‘Menlovean’ act of negligence still constitutes the breach of a 
norm set by tort law” and that “it is erroneous to see in doctrines such as respondeat superior 
and ‘strict’ products liability a judicial embrace of tort liability without regard to 
wrongdoing”). 
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explain or even consider why courts persist in describing these concepts in strictly 
instrumental terms.62  Most telling, Goldberg and Zipursky look primarily to the 
law’s structures and practices,63 and occasionally to its theorists,64 to discern Torts’ 
true nature.  But they disregard what human science depends on the most: the 
thoughts, emotions, and motivations of the lawyers and judges who have created, 
interpreted, and applied the law, and thus have made it what it is today. 
When Berlin’s “imaginative understanding” is applied to the history of Torts, the 
law’s true nature soon emerges.   Holmes, the law’s creator, saw Torts as a tool of 
the judicial elite.  Under this view, judges were the masters of law, not slaves to it.  
They could break free of the law’s formal restraints whenever social necessity and 
public policy so required.  Holmes preached this sermon to an already receptive 
congregation.  Schooled in the philosophies of realism, pragmatism, empiricism, 
logical positivism, and progressivism,65 nineteenth-century judges were naturally 
predisposed to seize their new-found power to legislate from the bench.  
                                                          
 
62
 See infra Part IV, at 20-25. 
 
63
 See Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort, supra note 22, at 581 (arguing that a successful 
tort theory must make “as much sense as can be made of the practices and principles of tort 
law as we find it”); see also Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 706-07 (asserting that 
because “our practices are partially constitutive of our ways of thinking . . . the understanding 
of legal concepts requires an understanding of the structure of practical inferences in which 
our legal concepts and principles are involved,” and terming this process of inquiry 
“pragmatic conceptualism”).  Such “pragmatic conceptualism” has serious limitations.  As 
Holmes noted, “the law is always approaching, and never reaching consistency” because “[i]t 
is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from 
history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off.”  OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).  Thus, at any given time, the law will possess 
some principles, practices, or structures that may look important because of their longevity 
and embeddedness, but which actually are anachronistic; and it will also contain other 
principles, practices, or structures that appear insignificant because of their novelty, but which 
actually are vital to the law’s current operation.  See infra text accompanying notes 207-10.  
Even when these vestigial and transitional features are minimized, pragmatic conceptualism’s 
descriptive accuracy and usefulness is only temporary.  To quote Holmes once more, 
“[h]owever much we may codify the law into a series of seemingly self-sufficient 
propositions, those propositions will be but a phase in a continuous growth.”  OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 37 (1881).  
 
64
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 921-29 (discussing in their 
treatment of pragmatism and instrumentalism, the views of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 
Professors William Prosser, John Fleming, Patrick Atiyah, Guido Calabresi (a professor and 
judge), Richard Posner (a professor and judge), and Fleming James, Jr.; and discussing in their 
treatment of justice-based theories, the views of Professors George Fletcher, Jules Coleman, 
Richard Epstein, Stephen Perry, Arthur Ripstein, Ernest Weinrib, Robert Stevens, and John 
Gardner); see also John C. P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1221, 1237 & n.40 (2008) (discussing early U.S. treatises by Francis Hilliard and Charles 
Greenstreet Addison); John C. P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full 
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 444-45, 456-59 (2006) (discussing the adoption of a 
Blackstonian view of Torts by treatise writers Nathan Dane, Zephaniah Swift, and Simon 
Greenleaf). 
 
65
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, MacPherson, supra note 1, at 1757-58, 1800-02 (describing 
how nineteenth-century jurists influenced by emergent strands of pragmatism, empiricism, 
and logical positivism rejected the previous formalist conception of law and judicial 
decisionmaking); Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort, supra note 22, at 520 (noting how 
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If Goldberg and Zipursky are correct, judges historically and uniformly resisted 
this temptation, opting instead to preserve their Blackstonian shackles by serving 
merely as disinterested referees in private disputes over rights and wrongs.  But 
common sense and human nature say otherwise.  As Bertrand Russell once observed, 
“the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which 
Energy is the fundamental concept in physics.”66  Like energy, power is kinetic: 
never dormant or idle, but always active and impelling—constantly imposing its 
force until it is stopped or redirected.  Thus, even if tort law were preoccupied with 
wrongs, as Goldberg and Zipursky contend, it seems doubtful that its judicial 
stewards would relinquish any part of their power to combat such transgressions.  
More likely, they would respond with their entire arsenal, punishing current culprits 
while deterring future transgressors, and spreading their losses to minimize the harm 
to society.  In fact, the more people their power benefitted, the more irresistible they 
would find it to be.  For as H.L. Mencken has noted, “[t]he urge to save humanity is 
almost always only a false-face for the urge to rule it.”67   
This interpretation is hard to reconcile with Goldberg and Zipursky’s monistic 
theory of Torts.  Torts targets Wrongs, but it also distributes Losses.  While it 
provides victims a right of recourse, it also affords government a power of social 
reform.  Using the highly particularized perspective of the human sciences, tort law 
appears more pluralistic, attempting to do different things depending on the people, 
problems, and places involved.  At the very least, it seems to fuse Wrongs and 
Losses into a completely independent hybrid concept—one that inextricably 
intertwines private rights and public policies, using each to define, reinforce, alter, 
and limit the other.  Perhaps Goldberg and Zipursky can find a wrongs-based 
account for this phenomenon.  But until they do, it appears that they have not 
described the intricate and unique detail of Torts’ structure and content so much as 
they have stuffed it into their own theoretical box, distorting much of what appears 
within and ignoring all that does not fit. 
III.  DISTORTING STRICT LIABILITY’S SIGNIFICANCE 
Although Goldberg and Zipursky’s perspective problem permeates their entire 
theory, it is most evident in their flawed assessment of strict liability, as noted above.  
In their view, strict liability is rightly overlooked because it is an insubstantial fringe 
concept.68  Although they do not provide an explicit basis for this characterization, 
their reasoning seems to be mostly quantitative, as they spend much of their article 
cataloguing the wide variety of torts that fit within their theory.69  Because the most 
                                                          
populism, progressivism, pragmatism, empiricism, and logical positivism shaped modern tort 
law). 
 
66
 BERTRAND RUSSELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS 12 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 
1938). 
 
67
 H.L. MENCKEN, MINORITY REPORT: H.L. MENCKEN’S NOTEBOOKS 247 (1956). 
 
68
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 951-52. 
 
69
 See id. at 938-71 (discussing civil recourse theory’s consistency with the tort actions of 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land and chattels, conversion, nuisance, 
medical malpractice, fraud and misrepresentation, negligence, products liability, intentional 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution and abuse of process, 
defamation, invasion of privacy, tortious interference with contract and with prospective 
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common tort of negligence and the great majority of torts overall require some sort 
of wrong, they suggest, the wrong-free theory of strict liability is relatively 
unimportant. 
The trouble is, neither popularity nor usage definitively measure a theory’s 
significance.  There are other reliable metrics of importance, and they all seem to 
point toward a different conclusion. 
One such criterion is the theory’s role in the broader structure of Torts.  Since its 
formal emergence in the nineteenth century, tort law has consistently recognized 
three grounds for holding people liable: acting with a wrongful intent, behaving 
negligently, and engaging in strict liability activities.70  These theories of liability, in 
turn, traditionally have been categorized as either fault-based (intentional torts and 
negligence) or fault-free (strict liability).71  By either measure, the wrongless theory 
of strict liability has played a key role, claiming one-third of Torts’ theoretical 
spectrum and one-half of its conceptual paradigm.  Though its litigation presence 
may be modest, strict liability’s place within the grand scheme of Torts could hardly 
be more prodigious.  
The core status of strict liability is further confirmed by its longevity.  According 
to Goldberg and Zipursky,72 as well as most other tort theorists,73 the theory of strict 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities first emerged in the 1866 English case 
of Rylands v. Fletcher.74  Since that time, it has been adopted by an overwhelming 
majority of American jurisdictions75 and has been incorporated into all three Torts 
restatements, including the latest edition just recently completed.76  If it had no other 
credentials, this theory’s endurance and proliferation for nearly a century and a half 
would provide reason enough to take it seriously. 
But this is only half the story.  In Rylands, Judge Blackburn, writing for the 
Exchequer Chamber, premised the court’s holding on a much older line of cases.  
“The case that has most commonly occurred, and which is most frequently to be 
                                                          
economic advantage, injurious falsehood, slander of title, and various forms of unfair 
competition, and with the tort concepts of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and 
declaratory relief, predicate injuries and parasitic damages, duty, misfeasance and 
nonfeasance, and superseding cause). 
 
70
 See CALNAN, REVISIONIST, supra note 14, at 22-23. 
 
71
 See id. at 23; Jeremiah Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability—Suggested Changes in 
Classification, 30 HARV. L. REV. 241, 255-56 (1917). 
 
72
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 951-52 (discussing 
Rylands v. Fletcher, (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex.), rev’d, Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] 1 L.R. 
Exch. 265, aff’d, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.)). 
 
73
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 950-51 (discussing Rylands); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS 545-48 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (same). 
 
74
 Rylands v. Fletcher, (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex.), rev’d, Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] 
1 L.R. Exch. 265, aff’d, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.). 
 
75
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 954 (“Courts now have generally accepted the principle that 
for some activities involving special dangers, especially those not commonly pursued, liability 
can be imposed without fault . . . .”).  
 
76
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (2005); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).  
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found in the books,” Blackburn noted, “is as to the obligation of the owner of cattle 
which he has brought on his land, to prevent their escaping and doing mischief.”77  
This obligation was not novel, but was “perfectly settled from early times.”78  
Because of the abnormal dangers posed by cattle, “the owner must keep them in at 
his peril, or he will be answerable for the natural consequences of their escape.”79 
At the very least, the cattle cases demonstrate that strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities is not, as Goldberg and Zipursky have described it, sui generis.80  
Indeed, it is merely the latest iteration of a widespread liability principle—one that 
also extended to dog owners, fire starters, and masters of servants.81  But more 
importantly, this history shows that strict liability is no trivial fad.  Instead, it is an 
ancient principle with a pedigree as long and distinguished as Torts itself.  Thus, it 
deserves as much respect and recognition as its wrong-based counterparts. 
One might take this point even a step farther.  Because of strict liability’s 
extraordinary liberty-restricting effect, it warrants special consideration.  Wrong-
based torts merely regulate the specific details of individual acts, sanctioning 
intentionally harmful or negligent behavior only when it is inappropriate for the 
prevailing circumstances.82  Strict liability, by contrast, regulates entire activities, 
like blasting explosives or spreading toxic chemicals.83  Once a strict liability activity 
results in harm, its restraint on the actor’s freedom is automatic and severe, forcing 
her to pay for the loss regardless of her level of care.  Since the abnormally 
dangerous designation is categorical, each finding of strict liability is socially 
significant.  Besides fining the actor already in court, it imposes a risk tax on all who 
pursue the same enterprise.  In these respects, strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities is a lot like capital punishment.  It may not be implemented very 
often, but the magnitude of its sanction makes it worthy of serious attention. 
Indeed, strict liability’s wrongless approach should be especially pertinent to 
legal scientists like Goldberg and Zipursky.  Returning to our earlier metaphor, 
Goldberg and Zipursky conclude that the vial of tort law is filled primarily with 
Substance A (Wrongs), an ingredient, like water, essential to existence.  However, 
they also have detected traces of Substance B (Strict Liability), an element, like 
arsenic, that contaminates Substance A and threatens the entire system it supports.  
To the true scientist, the discovery of the arsenic-like theory of strict liability in the 
pristine (Wrongs laced) water of Torts should be an alarming development 
warranting further investigation and scrutiny.  To Goldberg and Zipursky, however, 
it is but a trifling and forgettable curiosity.  By touting the mixture’s organic quality, 
they have offered us a tainted tonic with the promise of purity. But just because they 
are skillful importuners does not mean we should blindly take a drink. 
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 Rylands, [1866] 1 L.R. Ex. 265, 280 (Blackburn, J.). 
 
78
 Id. 
 
79
 Id.  
 
80
 See Goldberg & Zipurksy, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 952. 
 
81
 See CALNAN, REVISIONIST, supra note 14, at 248-74. 
 
82
 See Calnan, Strict Liability, supra note 15, at 118. 
 
83
 See Calnan, Anomalies, supra note 15, at 242-43. 
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IV.  DISTORTING THE RELATION BETWEEN STRICT LIABILITY AND WRONGS 
Even if Goldberg and Zipursky were correct in their assessment of abnormally 
dangerous activities, their conclusion still would not prove Wrong’s supremacy.  
Tort law abounds with strict liability theories of all stripes.  While some of these 
theories may contain aspects of wrongs—a contention I shall address in a moment—
they present a formidable challenge to civil recourse’s exclusivity thesis, and cannot 
be casually dismissed or consciously circumvented. 
Strict liability covers most subjects of human interest and endeavor.  Besides 
abnormally dangerous activities, strict liability has long applied to animals, 
including livestock as mentioned above,84 but also wild beasts and vicious pets.85  In 
addition, strict liability historically has applied to property, using conversion to 
redress personal property invasions,86 and trespass to land and nuisance to protect 
rights in real estate.87  More recently, strict liability has been extended to products, 
particularly those containing defects in design, manufacture, or marketing.88  Finally, 
strict liability may even apply to people, making principals vicariously liable for the 
harmful acts of their agents.89 
Goldberg and Zipursky do not dispute the existence of these theories.  Instead, 
they dispute whether these theories truly impose strict liability.  Using their 
interpretive approach, Goldberg and Zipursky argue that such actions are better 
understood as wrongs-based theories in disguise, specifically pointing to respondeat 
superior and strict products liability in their current piece,90 and elsewhere including 
the actions of trespass, conversion, and nuisance.91 
As a normative proposition, Goldberg and Zipursky’s “interpretation” is 
noncontroversial and even surprisingly compelling.  One could find fault concepts in 
such actions, and could assimilate them into a wrongs-based system of Torts.92  In 
                                                          
 
84
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 942-43. 
 
85
 See id. at 945-49. 
 
86
 See JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 797-98 
(2d ed. 2008) (discussing Ranson v. Kitner, 31 Ill. App. 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1889)). 
 
87
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 101, 1324-25. 
 
88
 See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 344-45 (2d ed. 2008). 
 
89
 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 73, at 500-01. 
 
90
 See Goldberg & Zipurksy, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 952 n.177. 
 
91
 See Goldberg & Zipurksy, Internal Point of View, supra note 1, at 1586 n.72. 
 
92
 Regarding respondeat superior, Professor Gregory Keating notes that, depending on 
one’s perspective, this theory might be classified either as fault-based or as imposing strict 
liability, and how one views this theory will affect her interpretation of tort law in general: 
If we believe, say, that the strict liability of masters for the torts of their servants under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior is part of the law of agency proper—and that it is 
incorporated into the law of torts only to solve the problem of identifying the legal 
“persons” to whom liability attaches—we will find it easer to see the law of torts itself 
as constructed around a general commitment to fault liability.  The strict liability of 
respondeat superior will appear essentially anomalous.  Conversely, if we 
see respondeat superior as an ancient common-law redoubt of strict liability in tort, we 
will find it easier to see the law of torts itself as torn between competing principles of 
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fact, I have offered just such an account in a previous article.93  For example, the 
animal torts formally eschew fault, but routinely employ a negligence-like standard 
of normalcy that condemns animal owners who unfairly jeopardize their neighbors 
by exposing them to unusually and thus excessively dangerous creatures.94  While 
the actions of trespass and conversion occasionally impose liability without fault, 
they often are classified and analyzed as intentional torts because they frequently 
proceed from the actor’s deliberate decision to interfere with the property interests of 
others.95  Similarly, though private nuisance can be framed as a strict liability tort, it 
typically involves an actor’s intentional challenge to her neighbor’s property rights, 
and is always resolved by assessing the reasonableness of the actor’s interference.96  
A similar reasonableness analysis commonly determines the issue of product 
defectiveness, despite the contradictory promise of the nominally deceptive theory of 
“strict” products liability.97  Even the doctrine of respondeat superior, which holds 
employers strictly liable for the acts of their employees, conditions that liability on 
the relatively high degree of control exercised by principals over their agents, and 
the abnormally high degree of danger posed by these commercial armies to the 
public at large.98 
From a purely descriptive standpoint, however, Goldberg and Zipursky’s 
wrongs-based construction of these strict liability theories seems counterintuitive 
                                                          
responsibility for harm done.  Instead of seeing the law of torts as a realm of fault 
liability punctuated by exceptional pockets of strict liability, we will be more inclined 
to see it as terrain contested by competing principles of fault and strict responsibility.  
The way in which we categorize the doctrine of respondeat superior both expresses an 
understanding of its place in the law of torts and affects our understanding of the 
entire law of torts. 
Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress a Freestanding Tort?, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2009). 
 
93
 See generally Calnan, Strict Liability, supra note 15 (discussing how various strict 
liability doctrines can be grounded in the “fault” concept of reasonableness, and proposing a 
liberal-justice paradigm for restructuring such doctrines). 
 
94
 See City of Tonkawa v. Danielson, 27 P.2d 348, 349 (Okla. 1933) (stating that owners 
or possessors of wild animals may be negligent for “keeping an animal belonging to a class 
which, from the experience of mankind, is dangerous”); DOBBS, supra note 9, at 949 (noting 
that owners or possessors of wild animals are subject to liability because “these animals and 
the risks they bring with them are uncommon or abnormal in the community” and that 
wildness is determined by “whether, by local custom, [these animals are] devoted to the 
service of mankind or commonly treated by the community as a tame or domestic animal[s]”). 
 
95
 See id. at 98-99, 123, 128-30. 
 
96
 See id. at 1324-30 (noting that unreasonableness is grounded in custom and community 
standards and is determined, like negligence, by balancing various considerations, including 
the activity’s utility and potential gravity of harm). 
 
97
 See OWEN, supra note 88, at 266-68, 312-18, 508-14 (indicating that defectiveness often 
is determined by the same cost-benefit analysis used in negligence, and that a finding of 
defectiveness means that something is “wrong” with the product). 
 
98
 See Calnan, Strict Liability, supra note 15, at 124 (comparing employers to army 
commanders, and noting that their power and capacity to harm increases with the size of their 
army of agents). 
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and incomplete.  If, as Goldberg and Zipursky suggest, Torts is overwhelmingly a 
law of Wrongs, one would expect courts both to be aware of its essential nature and 
to conform the law to its core concepts whenever possible.  Thus, in cases where the 
controlling liability principle is even remotely in doubt, a judge’s first instinct should 
be to revert to the default rule of Wrongs.  So why, then, have judges so frequently 
gone the other way—rejecting a wrongs-based interpretation and adopting the 
concepts and nomenclature of strict liability? If they are simply mistaken, how could 
so many jurists be so foolish for so long?  If they truly understand tort law, why 
would they conspire to conceal so many wrongs so completely?  Unfortunately, 
Goldberg and Zipursky can have no answers to these questions, because it is they, 
not the judges, who have sidestepped the obvious.  In fact, their failure to account for 
these anomalies violates their own first principle of descriptive theorizing: namely, 
“to work with, rather than dismiss as empty, the ways in which those acting within a 
practice make sense of it.”99  
Working with all the facts, the commonsense explanation for these phenomena is 
that courts apply strict liability because they believe in its independent legitimacy; 
and when its theoretical lines become stretched or blurred, they are quick to correct 
the problem.  The best and most recent example of this appears in the field of 
products liability.  Originally, strict products liability applied to all types of product 
defects.100  To assess design cases, courts employed a risk-utility analysis similar to 
the Hand formula of negligence.101  In warning cases, they adopted a test of 
adequacy or reasonableness.102  Eventually, courts recognized that fault was the true 
basis of liability in both actions.103  Accordingly, many jurisdictions now openly 
acknowledge the “functional equivalence” of negligence and strict liability for 
design and warning defects, and some apply negligence principles explicitly and 
exclusively in such cases.104  Recognizing this trend, the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
soon followed suit, and strict products liability was practically laid to rest.105  
                                                          
 
99
 Goldberg & Zipursky, The Internal Point of View, supra note 1, at 1577. 
 
100
 See OWEN, supra note 88, at 33-38, 265-71, 344-45 (noting that the general requirement 
of defectiveness eventually split into separate theories of manufacturing, design, and warning 
defect).  
 
101
 See id. at 33, 312-17, 508-14 (showing that both analyses balance the defendant’s 
burden (B) of taking additional precautions against the potential accident costs to the plaintiff 
and society (as measured by the probability (P) and magnitude of the expected loss (L)) if 
such precautions are not taken, and impose liability when the burden is less than the risk of 
loss—a calculation expressed by the formula B<PxL→negligence or defectiveness).  
 
102
 See id. at 594-95 (“[I]t might be said that to be adequate, a warning must provide a 
reasonable amount and type of information about a product’s material risks and how to avoid 
them in a manner calculated to reach and be understood by those likely to need the 
information.”). 
 
103
 See id. at 33. 
 
104
 See id. at 107-10 (citing and discussing cases). 
 
105
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (b)-(c) (1998) (adopting 
reasonableness concepts to determine design and warning defects); see also OWEN, supra note 
88, at 110 (“These developments in the courts are mirrored by the Products Liability 
Restatement, which acknowledges that liability for both defective design and defective 
warning is based on principles of negligence.”). 
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Ironically, so was a key assumption of civil recourse theory.  If, as this experience 
proves, courts can disentangle and prune back strict liability for products, Goldberg 
and Zipursky are hard-pressed to explain why judges cannot and have not done 
similar groundskeeping to all of the other strict liability theories that allegedly 
camouflage their scheme of wrongs.   
But this is the least of Goldberg and Zipursky’s worries.  Assuming fault does 
lurk within strict liability, and reasons do exist for keeping it concealed, civil 
recourse theory still only tells a half-truth.  While it accounts for the wrongs within 
strict liability, it ignores the strict liability encasing these wrongs.  This omission 
appears founded in the belief that the two concepts are mutually exclusive, with 
wrongs always trumping their strict liability competitors in cases of comingling.  
The evidence, however, supports a different conclusion.  Strict liability concepts not 
only can coexist with wrongs within the same cause of action, they can influence that 
mixture in way that defies Goldberg’s and Zipursky’s bright-line scheme of 
categorization. 
Aside from trespass and conversion, which typically are regarded as wrongs-
based intentional torts,106 all of the strict liability theories eschewed by Goldberg and 
Zipursky contain distinctive no-fault features that override, offset, or transform the 
latent wrongs buried within. In animal cases, for example, courts generally invoke 
purely instrumental (nonwrongs-based) considerations to interpret and apply the 
theory’s substantive elements.107  So disposed, they routinely broaden their 
construction of proximate causation beyond the normal limits of foreseeability.108  
Quite frequently, they forbid analysis of the plaintiff’s fault, limiting defendants to 
the defense of voluntary assumption of risk—a theory both widely disfavored and 
notoriously difficult to prove.109 
                                                          
 
106
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 95-96, 122-27 (classifying trespass torts as intentional 
interferences with exclusive possession of real or personal property, and conversion as the 
intentional and substantial exercise of dominion and control over personal property). 
 
107
 See, e.g., Isaacs v. Powell, 267 So. 2d 864, 865-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (“[O]ur 
society imposes more than enough risks upon its members now, and we are reluctant to 
encourage the addition of one more particularly when that one more is increasingly 
contributed by those who, for profit, would exercise their ‘right’ to harbor wild animals and 
increase exposure to the dangers thereof by luring advertising.”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 
73, at 536-37 (noting that “new reasons of social policy” have been used to justify strict 
liability for animal keepers, including the keeper’s profit motive and her ability to shift or 
distribute the loss to others). 
 
108
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 510 (1977) (providing that one who possesses a 
wild or abnormally dangerous domestic animal shall not be relieved of strict liability by 
unforeseeable forces of nature or the unforeseeable, innocent, negligent, or reckless conduct of 
another, and expressing no opinion whether such liability would be superseded by an 
intentional intervening act).  
 
109
 See Isaacs, 267 So. 2d at 866 (holding that the plaintiff’s conduct only bars her recovery 
if she voluntarily brings the calamity upon herself); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 524 (1977) (providing that contributory negligence is not a defense to a strict liability 
action unless the plaintiff knowingly and unreasonably subjects herself to the risk posed by 
the activity in question); Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 481, 482 (2002) (“The modern conventional wisdom is that assumption of risk should be 
completely merged or assimilated within comparative fault and abolished as a distinct 
doctrine.”). 
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Nuisance’s strict liability signature is even more pronounced.  While nuisance 
requires proof of an unreasonable interference with property, its conception of 
unreasonableness bears little resemblance to private wrongs.110  According to section 
826 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, such an invasion is unreasonable if either 
“the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct” or “the harm 
caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this 
and similar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not 
feasible.”111  Under the first test, “[t]he process of weighing the gravity of the harm 
against the utility of the conduct assesses the social value of the actor’s activity in 
general.”112  Thus, conduct that otherwise might amount to a private wrong could be 
justified, under the right circumstances, as serving the greater public good.113  
However, such socially valuable conduct still might be actionable under the second 
test of unreasonableness if the actor could pay for its harmful effects without 
jeopardizing her enterprise.114  But here, as in the theory of strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities,115 the liability does not punish or preempt such 
conduct, which is not wrongful at all.116 Instead, it merely forces the actor to treat 
these losses as ordinary business expenses and to distribute them through insurance 
and price adjustments.117 
A similar pattern exists in products liability cases.  Outwardly, the theory of strict 
products liability for design defects, like the theory of nuisance, exudes the moral 
architecture of private wrongs.  Both rely on a risk-utility analysis to determine 
liability.118  But just like nuisance, strict design liability does not focus exclusively 
on the relationship of the parties. It also looks to the world beyond.  Part of this 
global perspective is systemic.  Because strict products liability was founded on 
instrumental concerns, public policy tends to permeate the interpretation of each 
                                                          
 
110
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 1326. 
 
111
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1965). 
 
112
 Id. cmt. b & §§ 827, 828. 
 
113
 See Carpenter v. The Double R Cattle Co., Inc., 701 P.2d 222, 228 (Idaho 1985) 
(holding that a cattle feedlot, which the dissent described as an “odoriferous quagmire,” was 
not liable for nuisance to an adjacent homeowner because such agricultural enterprises were 
vital to the state’s economy and thus had a high social utility). 
 
114
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 cmt. f (1965) (“It may sometimes be 
reasonable to operate an important activity if payment is made for the harm it is causing, but 
unreasonable to continue it without paying.”). 
 
115
 See id. § 822 cmt. k (favorably comparing this form of nuisance to strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities by noting “[a]n abnormally dangerous enterprise is required 
to pay its way by compensating for the harm it causes, because of its special, abnormal and 
dangerous character”). 
 
116
 See id. § 826 cmt. f (indicating that such a nuisance action “does not seek to stop the 
activity; it seeks instead to place on the activity the cost of compensating for the harm it 
causes”). 
 
117
 See id. 
 
118
 See OWEN, supra note 88, at 266-68, 312-18, 508-14. 
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element of every defect theory.119  The other part of this social outlook is strictly 
doctrinal.  In applying the risk-utility test, most jurisdictions typically rely on a long 
list of analytical factors.120 One notable list, known as the Wade factors, contains an 
explicitly social consideration with a decidedly instrumental objective: to force 
manufacturers, where feasible, to spread product-related losses by increasing the 
price of their goods or carrying liability insurance.121 
In addition to these substantive differences, strict design liability often 
implements a unique procedural scheme that blurs its true identity.  A central feature 
of wrongs-based actions is their requirement that plaintiffs prove defendants’ fault. 
Strict design liability, however, may relax or shift all or part of this burden. For 
instance, some jurisdictions do not require plaintiffs to prove the manufacturers’ 
actual or constructive knowledge of their product risks, something otherwise 
demanded by the Hand formula for negligence.122  Instead, they automatically 
impute such knowledge to manufacturers, and consider whether the makers acted 
reasonably in marketing their goods with these known dangers.123  Other 
jurisdictions, meanwhile, relieve plaintiffs of the entire burden of proving 
defectiveness.  Once plaintiffs show that their injuries were caused by a product’s 
design features, the burden shifts to the manufacturers to justify those designs by 
presenting evidence that the design’s utility exceeds its accompanying risks.124  In 
each situation, the focus remains on the manufacturers’ design choices, but the 
process for judging the product, and thus for imposing liability, is far stricter than 
most anything found in the fault paradigm.125 
                                                          
 
119
 See id. at 259-64, 288-97 (discussing the policy concerns that spawned strict products 
liability and that continue to influence its application). 
 
120
 See id. at 317, 510, 514-17.  
 
121
 See id. at 516.  The Wade factors include a product’s utility to the user and to the public 
as a whole, the safety aspects of the product including its likelihood to cause injury, the 
availability of an alternative product that would be equally efficacious and not as unsafe, the 
manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the product’s unsafe character without eliminating its 
usefulness or causing it to become too expensive to maintain its utility, the user’s ability to 
avoid danger by exercising care, the user’s awareness of the dangers and their avoidability 
based on common knowledge and product warnings, and most importantly for our purposes, 
the feasibility of the manufacturer to spread product losses by increasing its price or carrying 
liability insurance.  Id. 
 
122
 See id. at 548 (discussing the Wade-Keeton test for defectiveness, which “reliev[es] an 
injured plaintiff of the burden of proving the foreseeability of [product] risks . . . [and] 
imposes on the seller ‘constructive knowledge’ of any dangers its products may possess”). 
 
123
 See id. at 547-48, 550-51. 
 
124
 See, e.g., Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(shifting the burden of proof); see also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 
(Alaska 1979) (same); Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456 (Cal. 1978) (same); Ontai 
v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 739-40 (Haw. 1983) (same). 
 
125
 There are rare situations where wrongs-based theories do shift burdens of proof to 
defendants.  As I shall discuss within, however, these instances of burden-shifting are not true 
examples of fault-based liability, but rather are proof that even wrongs-based torts can be 
infiltrated and changed by nonwrongs-based, instrumental considerations.  See infra notes 
181-87 and accompanying text.  
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Sometimes strict products liability lacks even this token of fault. In 
manufacturing defect cases, a product is considered defective if it deviates from the 
manufacturer’s intended design, regardless of the level of care exercised by the 
manufacturer in its production.126  Here, as in the cost-of-business nuisance cases, 
liability requires no wrong at all.  Instead, manufacturers of all products, including 
goods with high social utility, are simply expected to treat unexpected and 
unavoidable manufacturing flaws as an ordinary business risk, and to absorb and 
spread the losses caused by these defects to their insurers, customers, employees or 
shareholders.127  To Goldberg and Zipursky, these nonwrongs-based, strict products 
liability cases apparently are too insignificant to mention.  But to the manufacturing 
industry, where production flaws mar every product line, they are a serious concern 
and a constant source of litigation.  Thus, they occupy a conspicuous niche in the 
jurisprudence of Torts. 
Even more troublesome for Goldberg and Zipursky’s interpretive analysis is the 
theory of respondeat superior.  Unlike other strict liability actions, which account for 
a relatively modest percentage of the total Torts docket, respondeat superior is a 
prime-time player.  Today, most tort suits are filed against businesses, and most 
businesses—apart from product sellers—are sued for the acts of their employees.128  
In many cases, such enterprises are accused of negligently hiring, training, or 
supervising their workers.129  But more frequently, their liability is premised on the 
concept of respondeat superior.130 
Besides their obvious prevalence, respondeat superior actions possess an 
uncertain normative basis that resists Goldberg and Zipursky’s definitive fault 
ascription.  By definition, respondeat superior holds an employer liable for an 
employee’s wrongful conduct when that conduct occurs within the scope of 
                                                          
 
126
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (a) (1998) (providing 
that a product contains a manufacturing defect when it departs from the manufacturer’s 
intended design, even though all possible care was exercised in its preparation and marketing). 
 
127
 See id. § 2 cmt. a (“[M]any believe that consumers who benefit from products without 
suffering harm should share, through increases in the prices charged for those products, the 
burden of unavoidable injury costs that result from manufacturing defects.”); see also OWEN, 
supra note 88, at 292-93, 295 (generally discussing the loss-spreading rationale of strict 
products liability). 
 
128
 See Mark E. Roszkowski & Christie L. Roszkowski, Making Sense of Respondeat 
Superior: An Integrated Approach for Both Negligent and Intentional Conduct, 14 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 235, 235 (2005) (“Lawsuits brought by third parties against 
employers for injuries caused by employees are among the most common civil lawsuits in the 
United States.”). 
 
129
 See id. at 235-36 (“[T]he employer may be held liable for its own intentional or 
negligent conduct[:] for example, the employer’s negligent hiring, training or supervision of 
the employee.”). 
 
130
 See id. at 236 (indicating that it is much more common for an employer to be held 
vicariously or derivatively liable for the employee’s tortious conduct under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior than to be sued for the negligent hiring, training, or supervision of its 
employees); Amy D. Whitten & Deanne M. Mosley, Caught in the Crossfire: Employers’ 
Liability for Workplace Violence, 70 MISS. L.J. 505, 516-38 (2000) (discussing the various 
“emerging” theories of direct employer liability for  employee misconduct and noting their 
secondary status to the primary theory of respondeat superior). 
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employment.131  While the employee’s fault is critical to this theory, the employer’s 
fault is not.  Indeed, the employer may be held liable even though she did not direct, 
ratify, or even know of the employee’s act.132  Ultimately, the imposition of liability 
turns on the interpretation of “scope of employment.”133  Over the years, courts and 
commentators have offered a wide variety of justifications for construing that test 
broadly or narrowly, with the broader interpretations leaning towards strict liability 
and the narrower ones favoring fault.134 
On the fault side, one theory holds that “scope of employment” merely serves as 
a proxy for the employer’s negligence, since the employer exercises greater control 
over behavior directly related to its business purpose.135  Goldberg himself offers an 
alternate theory in a different article, contending that the employee and employer 
represent a single “fused agent” whose culpable conduct is rightfully attributed to its 
dual constituents.136  
But these approaches certainly do not dominate the literature on the subject.  For 
every fault-based interpretation, there are several strict liability counterparts 
competing for acceptance.  Baty, who wrote one of the earliest and most influential 
treatises on vicarious liability, argued that respondeat superior was simply a means 
of accessing the wealth of deep-pocket entities like corporations.137  Meanwhile, 
courts have defended this strict liability interpretation on the grounds “(1) that an 
innocent person, either the plaintiff or the employer, must bear the loss, (2) that the 
employer had formal right of control over the employee’s work, or (3) that the 
employer benefits from the employee’s work.”138  Increasingly, respondeat superior 
has been justified on the openly instrumental theory of enterprise liability, which 
forces employers to pay for employee accidents, not because they have done 
something wrong, but because they have the ability to pass along such losses to their 
customers.139  This explains why employers often bear responsibility for reckless or 
                                                          
 
131
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 905 (noting that employers generally are jointly and 
severally liable for the torts of employees committed within the scope of employment). 
 
132
 See id. at 907 (“The master is liable for the servant’s negligent acts even though [the] 
master did not command those acts and could not foresee them in any specific way.”). 
 
133
 See id. at 910 (“[R]espondeat superior liability is imposed only for acts of the servant 
committed within the scope of his employment.”). 
 
134
 See id. at 907-10 (discussing the rationales for respondeat superior). 
 
135
 See id. at 908.  Professor Dobbs cautions, however, that such presumed “control is 
doubtful in many cases and the connection between the employee’s tort and the employer’s 
benefit is often tenuous.”  Id.  
 
136
 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The 
Restatement (Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1211, 1233 (2009). 
 
137
 See T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1916). 
 
138
 DOBBS, supra note 9, at 908 (footnotes omitted) (citing cases). 
 
139
 See, e.g., Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140 (Alaska 1972) (adopting an enterprise 
liability theory of respondeat superior); see also Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 471 P.2d 
988, 991 (Cal. 1970) (same); Leafgreen v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 275, 280-
81 (S.D. 1986) (same); Kenyon v. Second Precinct Lounge, 442 N.W.2d 696, 700-01 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1989) (endorsing this approach).  See generally DOBBS, supra note 9, at 908-09 
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even intentionally harmful employee conduct140—conduct wrongs-based theories 
consider so powerful and unforeseeable that it typically forecloses the liability of 
anyone else.141 
In sum, there are far more “pure” strict liability theories than Goldberg and 
Zipursky care to acknowledge, and these examples of nonwrongs-based liability are 
far more substantial than civil recourse theory can reasonably withstand.  Indeed, 
even when strict liability contains remnants of wrongs, the combination cannot be 
characterized by either of its components, but creates a hybrid species of Torts with 
liability characteristics all its own. Interestingly, and quite ominously for Goldberg 
and Zipursky, evidence of this synthesis is not exclusive to strict liability, but, as we 
shall see next, already appears within the realm of Wrongs.    
V.  A DISTORTED CONCEPTION OF WRONGS 
Goldberg and Zipursky define wrongs as “violations of legal norms not to 
mistreat others in various ways.”142  This definition has three parts.  As Goldberg and 
Zipursky explain, “[f]or every tort, there is an inquiry into the nature of the 
tortfeasor’s actions . . . , the nature of the setback suffered by the victim, and the 
connection between the two.”143  These parts are not self-sustaining, but 
interdependent.  Granted, all wrongful conduct has a distinct normative dimension, 
eliciting society’s “disdain” by transgressing a mandate that it “not . . . be 
performed.”144  But, ultimately, a bad act is a tort only if it produces a legally 
forbidden harm to a legally protected person.145  Because the act, the harm, and the 
victim are causally integrated, the determination of “wronging” must proceed from 
the unique circumstances of each tortious event. It cannot, and according to 
Goldberg and Zipursky, does not depend on factors external to that relationship. 
Putting aside their claims about legal duties and relationality, which have been 
attacked elsewhere,146 there is a lot wrong with Goldberg and Zipursky’s descriptive 
                                                          
(discussing the use of enterprise liability theory as a basis for respondeat superior); Gregory C. 
Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and the Common Law of Strict Liability, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1307 (2001) (arguing that “[r]espondeat superior liability is—and should 
be—liability for the ‘characteristic risks’ of an activity,” which the author describes as 
enterprise liability). 
 
140
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 913 (“[A]t least since the middle of the 20th century, courts 
have often . . . recognize[d] that intentional torts committed by an employee are within the 
scope of employment when employment furnishes the specific impetus for or increases a 
general risk of employee misbehavior.”). 
 
141
 See id. at 470-71 (“If an intervening and unforeseeable intentional harm or criminal act 
triggers the injury to the plaintiff, the criminal act is ordinarily called a superseding cause, 
with the result that the defendant who negligently creates the opportunity for such acts escapes 
liability.”). 
 
142
 Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 986. 
 
143
 Id. at 944. 
 
144
 Id. at 949. 
 
145
 See id. at 943-44. 
 
146
 See Stapleton, supra note 8, at 1531 (rejecting their relationality thesis as overly 
discretionary, unnecessarily awkward, and distastefully discriminatory and recommending a 
conception of Torts that provides general, nonrelational guidance directives to citizens). 
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account of Torts as Wrongs. In my view, what they fail to observe is even worse 
than what they think they see. In fact, their omissions here erode the very foundation 
of civil recourse theory.  When one’s eyes are open to the truth it quickly becomes 
apparent that wrongs-based torts are routinely influenced by a host of nonwrongs-
based social considerations, with the most prominent and pervasive infiltration 
occurring in the theory of negligence—the tort most symbolic of wrong’s supposed 
domination.  Indeed, as we shall see below, public policy does not just patrol the 
periphery of negligent wrongs; it penetrates each and every one of negligence’s 
elements of proof and even invades its affirmative defenses. 
The clearest example of this encroachment—and the one most damaging to 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory—appears in the element of duty.  According to 
Goldberg and Zipursky, duty is mostly a private ideal.  It establishes the terms under 
which accident victims are authorized to enforce against their offenders certain 
norms of noninjury.147 But for most courts, duty is not so limited.  They see duty 
more as a public mechanism, which enables judges to create and contour negligence 
rules to promote the general welfare.  To fulfill this function, courts faced with 
difficult duty questions regularly employ some form of multifactor analysis.148  
Admittedly, this analysis may include “private” considerations like the foreseeability 
and magnitude of the plaintiff’s injury, the extent of defendant’s burden of 
precaution, the overall blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct, or the nature of 
the parties’ relationship.149  However, the analysis does not stop there.  It also weighs 
                                                          
 
 
147
 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 919, 941-45. 
 
148
 See CALNAN, DUTY AND INTEGRITY, supra note 15, at 83. 
 
149
 See, e.g., HealthONE v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 888 (Colo. 2002). 
In determining whether a duty should be recognized, a court must consider many 
factors, including: (1) the risk involved, (2) the foreseeability and likelihood of 
injury as weighed against the social utility of the actor’s conduct, (3) the 
magnitude of the burden guarding against injury or harm, and (4) the 
consequences of placing the burden upon the actor. 
Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Ass’n, Inc., 823 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Conn. 2003).  
[T]he test for the existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of 
whether an ordinary person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the 
defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general 
nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of 
a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent 
conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the 
case. 
Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1123-24 (Ill. 2002).  
In determining whether a duty exists, courts look to certain relevant factors.  These 
include: (1) the reasonable foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct may injure 
another, (2) the likelihood of an injury occurring, (3) the magnitude of the burden 
of guarding against such injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on 
the defendant. 
Heck ex rel. Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 2003) (Duty “analysis involves a 
balancing of three factors: (1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the reasonable 
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a wide variety of public policy concerns, including, often explicitly, the duty’s 
potential deterrent effect and the parties’ respective abilities to spread the loss 
through insurance or otherwise.150 
Thus, contrary to Goldberg and Zipursky’s assertion, duty is not just about 
defining private wrongs, but is also about solving or ameliorating some very public 
problems.  This social mission is no casual side job, nor are the  effects insubstantial.   
Instead, it is a permanent and pervasive aspect of negligence’s lawmaking process.  
                                                          
foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public policy concerns.”); Danler v. 
Rosen Auto Leasing, Inc., 609 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Neb. 2000). 
[I]n determining whether a duty was to be imposed, this court employs a risk-utility 
test, considering (1) the magnitude of the risk, (2) the relationship of the parties, (3) 
the nature of the attendant risk, (4) the opportunity and ability to exercise care, (5) 
the foreseeability of the harm, and (6) the policy interest in the proposed solution. 
Sisson v. Jankowski, 809 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.H. 2002) (“When determining whether a duty is 
owed, we examine the societal interest involved, the severity of the risk, the likelihood of the 
occurrence, the relationship between the parties, and the burden upon the defendant.”); 
Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 723 A.2d 960, 964 (N.J. 1999) (“[T]he determination of such a duty 
‘involves identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors—the relationship of the parties, 
the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public 
interest in the proposed solution.’”); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia 
Center, Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (N.Y. 2001). 
The existence and scope of a tortfeasor’s duty is, of course, a legal question for the 
courts, which ‘fix the duty point by balancing factors, including the reasonable 
expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the 
likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation 
allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new 
channels of liability. 
Sharpe v. St. Luke's Hosp., 821 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Pa. 2003) (“The concept of duty is rooted in 
public policy, and the determination of whether a duty should be imposed upon an alleged 
tortfeasor involves a balancing of the following factors: (1) the relationship between the 
parties; (2) the social utility of the actor’s conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and 
foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; 
and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution.”).  
 
150
 See Castaneda v. Olsher, 162 P.3d 610, 615 (Cal. 2007) (finding that in analyzing duty, 
a judge must weigh  
[t]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct 
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the 
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the 
risk involved). 
See also Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 167 (Alaska 2002) (adopting this list of 
factors); Vincent v. The Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 29 P.3d 943, 945 (Idaho 2001) (same); 
Bowman v. Two, 704 P.2d 140, 143 (Wash. 1985) (same); Drwenski v. McColloch, 83 P.3d 
457, 464-65 (Wyo. 2004) (same). 
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From the most intimate cases of domestic privacy151 to the most commercial cases of 
premises liability,152 multifactor policy analysis creates the rules that determine what 
constitutes a wrong, and which wrongs are legally cognizable.  Indeed, because duty 
produces the law of negligence and because negligence occupies the broad middle 
ground of the Wrongs spectrum, the injection of policy in this element does more 
than merely threaten negligence’s supposed relational integrity; it strikes at the very 
core of the wrongs-based theory of Torts. 
Bad as this duty dilemma is, matters only get worse in the companion element of 
breach.  Besides establishing duties, public policy also informs the standards of care 
that accompany them.  For example, negligence law holds people with mental 
disabilities to the standard of ordinary adults, even though they often are incapable 
of meeting that standard.153  According to Goldberg and Zipursky, this standard, 
though strict, is still wrongs-based because it is based on norms of noninjury that 
express society’s disapproval for the offending conduct.154  But this explanation is 
rarely advanced by courts.  Instead, they typically rely on functional arguments, 
often decrying the difficulty of litigating the issue of insanity,155 endorsing the tactic 
of forcing disabled persons to absorb the social costs of their accidents,156 and 
touting the standard’s potential for creating a safety incentive for the caretakers of 
the mentally infirm.157 
                                                          
 
151
 See J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1997) (recognizing a spouse’s duty to protect 
others from the sexual misconduct of her mate after balancing public policies combating child 
sexual abuse and those promoting marriage and marital privacy). 
 
152
 See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993) (rejecting a shopping 
center’s duty to prevent the rape of a lessee’s employee after balancing public policies 
promoting public safety and those limiting the economic and social costs of private security 
measures). 
 
153
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 (2005) 
(stating that an adult actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in the standard of 
care for determining whether her conduct is negligent); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
283B (1965) (providing that mental deficiency does not relieve an actor from liability for 
conduct which does not conform to the standard of a reasonable person under like 
circumstances).  
 
154
 Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 2, at 949 (arguing that Torts’ 
directives convey “disdain” for the acts to which they apply and “express[] an injunctive 
message that such acts are not to be performed”). 
 
155
 See McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Mass. 1937) (“[C]ourts are loath to introduce 
into the great body of civil litigation the difficulties in determining mental capacity which it 
has been found impossible to avoid in the criminal field.”). 
 
156
 See id. (“[Just] as an insane person must pay for his support, if he is financially able, so 
he ought also to pay for the damage which he does; . . . an insane person with abundant wealth 
ought not to continue in unimpaired enjoyment of the comfort which it brings while his victim 
bears the burden unaided.”). 
 
157
 See id. (“[A] rule imposing liability tends to make more watchful those persons who 
have charge of the defendant and who may be supposed to have some interest in preserving 
his property.”); see also DOBBS, supra note 9, at 287 (noting that “some authorities have 
suggested that tort liability will provide proper incentives to those ‘in charge’ of the insane 
person to control his conduct”). 
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 Similar reasoning supports the standard of care for children. Normally, 
negligence law judges children by comparing them to other kids of similar age, 
intelligence, maturity, and experience.158  Like the standard for the mentally 
disabled, the child’s standard could be based on norms governing juvenile behavior.  
But usually it is not.  Rather, courts routinely invoke the familiar policy refrain that 
letting kids be kids is good for society because it lets them learn from their 
mistakes.159  When kids venture into adult activities, courts raise the behavioral bar 
accordingly, imposing an ordinary adult standard of care.160  Yet even here, the 
change is based more on public policy than any norm of noninjury, with courts 
determined to discourage kids from doing adult things to protect society from the 
extraordinary hazards of such activities.161 
Once the standard of care is settled, policy immediately reappears to help assess 
its breach.  Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts conduct is in breach, and thus 
unreasonable, if its risks outweigh its utility.162  In theory, this formula could be 
essentially wrongs-based, intending simply to balance the parties’ competing rights 
to liberty.163  In reality, however, it is much more.  Specifically, it provides still 
another opportunity to promote the public good.  According to the Restatement, an 
act’s utility depends substantially on its social value,164 while its risk depends 
heavily on its public impact, because of both the number of people it endangers and 
the social desirability of their threatened interests.165  Admittedly, the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts now softens these considerations,166 and they often are not presented 
                                                          
 
158
 See id. at 293. 
 
159
 See id. at 296 (describing the “welfare rationale” that the child’s standard of care allows 
children to gain experience by acting in the world freely so they can mature into reasonable 
adults). 
 
160
 See id. at 298-300 (indicating that most courts hold children to an adult standard of care 
when they engage in adult or inherently dangerous activities). 
 
161
 See Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Minn. 1961) (“We may take judicial 
notice of the hazards of automobile traffic, the frequency of accidents, the often catastrophic 
results of accidents, and the fact that immature individuals are no less prone to accidents than 
adults.”); Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392, 394 (Wash. 1979) (“Such a rule protects the 
need of children to be children but at the same time discourages immature individuals from 
engaging in inherently dangerous activities.”). 
 
162
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (providing that if the risk is of such 
a magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act then the act is 
considered negligent and the actor is considered unreasonable). 
 
163
 See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 177-89; Calnan, Fault(s), supra note 15, at 702-
10; Calnan, Strict Liability, supra note 15, at 99-104. 
 
164
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 cmt. a (1965) (stating that the social value 
of an act is the most important  factor in determining its utility).  
 
165
 See id. § 293 (a), (d) (listing these factors specifically as relevant in assessing an act’s 
dangerousness). 
 
166
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. h 
(2005) (“While negligence law is concerned with social interests, courts regularly consider 
private interests, both because society is the protector of private interests and because the 
general public good is promoted by the protection and advancement of private interests.”); see 
also id. cmt. j (“In those cases in which a plaintiff does allege negligence in the actor’s 
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to juries even where they still survive.167  But there is no denying that appellate 
courts purportedly following traditional negligence principles have entertained 
nonrelational factors in the determination of breach, and these factors have added a 
distinctly political dimension to the judgment of private wrongs.168  
 In fact, the politics of negligence has not been confined to duty or breach, but 
has extended deep into the element of causation.  The concept of proximate 
causation, in particular, has long flaunted its political propensities, dating all the way 
back to the Torts casebook classic of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.169  There, 
Judge Andrews, in a famous dissent, eloquently opined that proximate cause “is not 
logic” but “practical politics” which uses “convenience,” “public policy,” and “a 
rough sense of justice” to “arbitrarily decline[] to trace a series of events beyond a 
certain point.”170  Echoing and updating Andrews’ view, which has since become 
widespread, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently explained that  
[p]roximate or legal cause is a policy decision made by the legislature or 
the courts to deny liability for otherwise actionable conduct based on 
considerations of logic, common sense, policy, precedent and “our more 
or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands or of what is 
administratively possible and convenient.”171  
In short, proximate cause is, and always has been, the arch nemesis of civil recourse 
theory, plying its political influence to alter, abate, or annul existing norms of 
noninjury.  It is no wonder, then, why Goldberg and Zipursky have failed to account 
for its insidious instrumentalism.  Far from supporting a purely wrongs-based 
conception of negligence, this corrosive force only serves to discredit or destroy it. 
Policy’s role in the supposedly objective doctrine of factual causation is less 
obvious, though no less momentous.  Typically, factual causation is based on a fairly 
straightforward, seemingly factual, determination: but for the defendant’s 
negligence, the plaintiff would not have been harmed.172  However, the “but for” test 
is neither as clear nor as factual as it first appears.  In many cases, especially those 
involving negligent omissions, the analysis of factual causation requires a good bit 
of judgment, and this judgment derives from a good dose of policy. 
                                                          
decision to engage in an activity, the overall utility of the activity is a factor the court needs to 
consider.”). 
 
167
 See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1016-17 
(1994) (“[R]ather than telling juries to balance the costs and benefits of greater care, courts 
ordinarily instruct them to determine whether the actor behaved as a ‘reasonably prudent 
person’ would have under the circumstances.”). 
 
168
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 340, 344-48 (noting the often competing economic, moral, 
and administrative concerns surrounding this analysis). 
 
169
 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 
170
 Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 
171
 Snyder v. LTG Lufttechnische Gmbh, 955 S.W.2d 252, 256 n.6 (Tenn. 1997). 
 
172
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 409. 
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The California case of Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400173 aptly illustrates this 
trend.  In Saelzler, a group of unidentified men committed a daylight attack against a 
delivery woman in a common area of a low-rent apartment complex.  The delivery 
woman sued the apartment owner for negligence, claiming the owner failed to 
implement adequate security measures on its premises.  The owner moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that its negligence, if any, was not a factual cause 
of the attack. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the delivery woman’s 
action.  After the Court of Appeals reversed, the California Supreme Court reinstated 
the trial court’s judgment, finding that the delivery woman could not establish 
factual causation in this case.174 
At first blush, the Supreme Court’s holding appears to rest on a faithful 
application of the “but for” test.175  Noting that the complex was located in a high 
crime district, and that the attackers could have lawfully entered the premises as 
tenants of the owner, the Court found insufficient evidence to conclude that added 
security would have prevented the crime.176  However, elsewhere in its opinion, the 
Court revealed the true basis for its decision.   To fully resolve the question of 
factual causation, the Court asserted, it had to “balance two important and competing 
policy concerns: society’s interest in compensating persons injured by another’s 
negligent acts, and its reluctance to impose unrealistic financial burdens on property 
owners conducting legitimate business enterprises on their premises.”177  Indeed, in 
striking this balance, the Court both deepened and expanded its policy analysis.  A 
finding of factual causation under these facts, the Court warned, not only would 
force landowners to become virtual insurers of their property’s safety—effectively 
compelling them to raise rents for low-income families—but also would stifle the 
fair and efficient administration of justice by creating intractable problems of proof 
and line-drawing.178   
Even when the “but for” test cannot be satisfied, courts often rely on policy to 
create a special exception to avoid an unpalatable result.  For example, the lost 
chance of survival doctrine179 relaxes the traditional causation requirement to 
incentivize doctors to comply with their fiduciary duties to gravely ill patients.180  In 
                                                          
 
173
 Saelzler v. Advanced Grp. 400, 23 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2001). 
 
174
 Id. at 1155. 
 
175
 Although California uses the substantial factor test of causation, that test incorporates 
the but-for test.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965) (“In order to be a 
legal cause of another’s harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the 
actor not been negligent[;] [t]his is necessary, but it is not of itself sufficient.”).    
 
176
 Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1155. 
 
177
 Id. at 1145. 
 
178
 Id. at 1152. 
 
179
 Under the lost chance of survival doctrine, when a doctor misdiagnoses or mistreats a 
patient with less than a fifty-one percent change of survival—and who thus was likely to die 
from her underlying illness—she (or her estate) may establish causation by proving that the 
doctor substantially reduced her chance of surviving that illness.  See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 
434-38 (generally discussing the doctrine).  
 
180
 See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. 1983) 
(noting that refusing to recognize the lost chance doctrine would create “a blanket release 
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extreme situations, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur forces defendants to disprove 
factual causation181 to encourage them to reveal facts solely within their 
possession.182  Finally, the doctrines of alternative liability183 and market share 
liability184 employ the same burden-shifting technique to further the same disclosure 
policy,185 but also seek to spread devastating losses186 and punish and deter 
blameworthy actors, even though their agency is unclear.187 
Of course, none of this shows that causal concepts are irrelevant to wrongs, or 
that wrongs are irrelevant to the theory of negligence.  To the contrary, causation 
                                                          
from liability for doctors and hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of 
survival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence”).  
 
181
 This may occur in medical malpractice actions where the plaintiff is unconscious during 
treatment and thus unable to determine how she was injured.  See Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 
P.2d 687, 688 (Cal. 1944) (a patient placed under anesthesia for an appendectomy operation 
awoke with an unexplainable neck injury).  In this scenario, the court shifts to the defendant-
health care practitioners the burden of proving that they did not cause the plaintiff’s injury.  
See id. at 690. 
 
182
 See id. at 689 (“Without the aid of the doctrine a patient who received permanent 
injuries of a serious character, obviously the result of some one's [sic] negligence, would be 
entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to 
disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability.”); DOBBS, 
supra note 9, at 650-52 (discussing the Ybarra rule and its policy basis).  
 
183
 In alternative liability cases, two or more defendants have behaved negligently toward 
the plaintiff but only one defendant actually causes the plaintiff harm.  See Summers v. Tice, 
199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948) (finding that two hunters negligently fired their shotguns at the 
plaintiff, but only the shot of one hunter actually struck the plaintiff in the eye).  If the plaintiff 
sues all possible tortfeasors, who are few in number, but cannot after reasonable diligence 
identify the causally responsible party, the court shifts to the defendants the burden of 
exculpation.  See id. at 4.  Any defendant who cannot meet this burden is held jointly and 
severally liable for the loss.  See id. at 5 (stating that “defendants in cases like the present one 
may be treated as liable on the same basis as joint tort feasors”). 
 
184
 Where a large number of product manufacturers market essentially the same defective 
product, but the product of only one manufacturer actually causes a consumer’s injury, market 
share liability shifts to the defendant-manufacturers the burden of disproving causation if the 
manufacturers in court represent a substantial share of the market for the item.  See Sindell v. 
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal. 1980).  Manufacturers unable to eliminate their 
product as a potential cause are held liable in proportion to their market share.  See id. at 37.  
 
185
 See Summers, 199 P.2d at 4 (“Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position to offer 
evidence to determine which one caused the injury.”); DOBBS, supra note 9, at 427 (noting the 
“dubious” policy argument that the “defendants might know more than [the] plaintiffs”).   
 
186
 See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 (“From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better 
able to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective product . . . 
[because] ‘the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the 
public as a cost of doing business.’”). 
 
187
 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (“[W]e choose to 
apportion liability so as to correspond to the over-all culpability of each defendant, measured 
by the amount of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-large.”); Collins v. Eli 
Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52-53 (Wis. 1984) (apportioning market share liability on the basis 
of comparative fault principles). 
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links and activates the parties’ rights and duties, thereby authorizing one party to 
take coercive action against the other.188  Yet this discussion does show that 
causation is not solely about wrongs.  Instead, it is frequently about the pragmatic 
pursuit of purely social objectives.  Thus, while it is wrong for skeptics to ignore 
causation’s connection to wrongs, it is equally wrong for Goldberg and Zipursky to 
ignore the politics underlying that relationship. 
This oversight is all the more pernicious because it blends into the element of 
damages.  To establish causation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct 
resulted in some forbidden harm.  Indeed, the existence of a personal injury is what 
culminates the wrong and makes the encounter tortious.  However, tort law neither 
protects every interest nor redresses every wrong.  Negligence law, in particular, 
restricts recovery to only certain types of harms. Although these limits help to define 
wrongs, they are not based on relational considerations or norms of noninjury.  
Instead, they are consistently determined by practical necessity and public policy.  
Historically, two harms have been singled out for special attention.  When 
plaintiffs suffer emotional injuries or economic losses unaccompanied by any 
physical harm, courts routinely deny relief altogether or impose significant obstacles 
to their recovery.189  Casting these decisions as no-duty rules, judges rely on various 
policy arguments to curtail the categories of cognizable harms.  In cases of pure 
emotional distress, they point to the speculative nature of the plaintiff’s injury and 
the difficulties of proving psychic harm,190 the potential for fraudulent claims,191 the 
fear that the volume of claims will be great and will clog an already overburdened 
justice system,192 and the possible disparity between the defendant’s culpability and 
the amount of her financial responsibility for the plaintiff’s loss.193  Similar policy 
concerns surround pure economic losses.  Besides raising questions of conjecture, 
proof, floodgates, and proportionality,194 courts often invoke the classic instrumental 
policy of loss spreading, noting that businesses in jeopardy of suffering such 
damages typically can insure against them, and can incorporate their premium costs 
into the prices of their goods or services.195 
We see, then, that nonwrongs-based considerations of policy influence every 
element of the tort of negligence, and in so doing, shape our very notion of an 
unintentional wrong.  But policy’s insurgence in negligence is even more 
                                                          
 
188
 See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 47-49 (explaining the linking and activating 
functions of causation). 
 
189
 See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 822-24, 1282-87. 
 
190
 See id. at 822-23. 
 
191
 See id. at 822. 
 
192
 See id. at 824. 
 
193
 See id.  
 
194
 See People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 110 (N.J. 1985) 
(noting that judicial skepticism towards pure economic loss claims stems from a “fear of 
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transcendent.  It does not just define negligence, but also helps to excuse or mitigate 
it. 
Policy’s exculpatory effect is most evident in the affirmative defense of 
assumption of risk.  Originally, assumption of risk consisted of a plaintiff’s 
voluntary choice to encounter a known danger—a decision, like other forms of 
contributory negligence, that imbued her with full responsibility for her own 
injuries.196  But after the adoption of comparative fault, which merely diminished the 
plaintiff’s recovery, courts began to re-conceptualize the defense.  Some courts 
emphasized its fault-like qualities and simply merged it into comparative 
negligence.197  Others, however, recognized its independent status and continued 
using it as a complete bar to relief.198 
While a number of jurisdictions in the latter camp justified the bar on the 
plaintiff’s expression of consent,199 the remaining members relied on good old 
policy.  Under this approach, when a plaintiff engages in an inherently dangerous 
activity or occupation, the law automatically eliminates the duty of care owed by 
those creating such dangers, even if the plaintiff herself does not choose to waive 
their liability.200  In the case of recreational activities, this no-duty rule is designed to 
encourage citizen participation, which in turn promotes social fellowship, good 
health, and much-needed stress relief.201  Where dangerous occupations are involved, 
the policy adapts accordingly.  Rather than stimulating behavior, the duty limitation 
here is calculated to prevent excessive litigation by and overcompensation of 
individuals whose salaries and administrative remedies already protect them against 
the extraordinary hazards of their jobs.202 
*** 
Putting this all together, it soon becomes apparent what is truly wrong with Torts 
as Wrongs.  The theory it proposes is a stereotype and not a personality profile.  By 
focusing on Torts’ general features, Goldberg and Zipursky have created an 
interesting and alluring caricature of the field, but they have not described a real 
being with all its quirks and foibles.  Negligence, in particular, resists such broad 
characterization.  Far from fitting the image of moral and legal integrity, 
negligence’s persona is fickle if not schizophrenic, endowing its elements and 
defenses with fault concepts, but destabilizing them with policy agendas that are 
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incompatible or even contradictory.  One may call this amalgamation many things, 
but “one thing” is the one thing it is not. 
Goldberg and Zipursky miss the devil in these details because they believe—
quite optimistically—that tort law is immune from such corrupting influences.  As 
Goldberg has explained, “judges sometimes have the opportunity and power to 
advance [instrumental] goals in the course of presiding over tort cases[,] [b]ut when 
they do so purposefully, they are not applying and developing the law of tort, but 
departing from it.”203  Torts’ impenetrability supposedly comes from its conceptual 
solidarity.  Tort law is intelligible only as a group of structures and practices that 
“hang[] together” in a logical and predictable way.204  Concepts like litigation 
bipolarity, legal fault, causation, and damages define Torts because they combine 
harmoniously and function symbiotically to create a right of civil recourse for the 
redress of private wrongs.205  Instrumental doctrines and policies, by contrast, fall 
outside Torts because they are inhibited rather than advanced by many of the law’s 
other essential attributes.206 
But judging reality by form, function, and fitness is perhaps Goldberg and 
Zipursky’s biggest mistake.  It ignores the evolutionary nature of both life and law. 
Some very prominent structures—like human hair, a defining mammalian 
characteristic that has steadily receded in human beings and seems virtually destined 
for extinction207—remain in existence long after they have lost most or all of their 
practical usefulness.  Similarly, some deeply ingrained practices change functions 
over time, retaining their old forms while serving a myriad of new and different 
purposes that they are surprisingly ill-suited to accomplish.  This would seem to be 
the case with the customary handshake, which many believe began as an assurance 
of nonbelligerence,208 but later became an expression of vulnerability or respect, and 
now is everything from a casual greeting to a serious confirmation of agreement209 
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and even “our most important non-verbal communicative contrivance.”210  Thus, just 
because tort law maintains the structures of a wrongs-based system does not mean 
they are essential to its existence, much less determinative of its character.  
Likewise, the fact that Torts’ practices could serve a system of civil recourse does 
not mean that this is their only, or even their most important function.  On the 
contrary, it may merely suggest that tort law is constantly evolving from one state to 
another, slowly shedding its hoary vestiges while developing new characteristics as 
it adapts to changing social conditions, but mixing the expedient with the obsolete at 
every stage of the process. 
VI.  RIGHTING THE WRONGS OF CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY 
Civil recourse theory is a valiant effort by well-meaning theorists to put tort law 
“back on track” by offering a unified theory of wrongs-and-recourse and destroying 
the instrumentalist misconception that the law is nothing more than a formal means 
for allocating the costs of accidents.211  Ironically, however, this theory is its own 
worst enemy. By arguing that tort law currently is a law of wrongs, with only a few 
negligible specks of nonwrongs-based strict liability randomly scattered along its 
vast frontier, Goldberg and Zipursky help to hide instrumentalism’s systematic 
dismantling of the law’s inner framework.  Indeed, to deny this onslaught is to deny 
the existence of the very malady they seek to cure, thus obviating the need for 
further examination or future treatment.  To stop the surge of instrumentalism, 
Goldberg and Zipursky must first acknowledge Torts’ present state of pathology.  
Once they correct their own descriptive errors, they then can redirect civil recourse 
theory down a more promising normative path—one that not only restores rights and 
wrongs to tort law, but also rights the wrongs of their instrumentalist adversaries.   
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